



### **11th PRIME Plenary Meeting, Brussels, 16 November 2017** State of Play: Review of Rastatt disruption and first ideas for contingency plans

DB Netz AG | Bettina Wunsch-Semmler | 2017-11-16






1. Rastatt incident

#### 2. Rerouting of rail freight

#### 3. Review

# On August 12<sup>th</sup> a lowering of tracks happened south of Rastatt in the framework of tunnel construction works






As a consequence the route Karlsruhe - Basel had to be closed immediately and completely between Rastatt and Baden-Baden after the incident.


# The first actions on the damaged railway section involved stabilizing the tunnel construction site





**Excursus** 

#### **DB** NETZE The installation of provisional bridges was not possible for CORRIL several reasons and was discarded as a solution



- Deep foundation (3 6 m) can only be statically implemented outside the icing area, which means that 2 auxiliary bridges with an overlap length of 120 m are necessary
- An inquiry by DB, the German Armed Forces and the NATO member countries was negative
- The time required for the necessary track clearance, installation and foundation is greater than for the selected cast-in-place concrete
- Due to its surface-supporting effect, the cast-in-place concrete does not require a deep foundation and can therefore be shorter

# To restore operation on the high-frequency Rhine valley railway a concrete superstructure was built



For the secure and After production of As preventive lasting restoration of On 2 October 2017 the "concrete floor" measure a second the track a concrete the Rhine valley the laying of gravel, concrete slab was slab above the railway was back in rails and the build above the tunnel and below operation - five installation of the second tunnel tube days earlier than the existing to stabilize the signal technology originally planned superstructure was ground further began build - Karlsruhe Rasel -Construction of the concrete slab Rhine valley railways Ground level Shield backfilling

160 m

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
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
# Communication of the pre-defined diversion routes started already on 13 August 2017





### On average 30 % of the offered capacity was used





The capacity offer was only possible due to the good cooperation with neighbouring IMs, the RFC Rhine-Alpine, North Sea-Mediterranean and ScanMed.

Remark: Figures represent only information available to DB Netz; Trains deviated completely around Germany are missing

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# DB Netz took measures to reduce the impact of Rastatt and to improve the use of diversion routes



#### Crisis Management Communication

- Weekly telephone conferences on CEO-level of the countries involved
- Daily telephone conferences on working level between the concerned RUs, IMs and DB Netz

### Capacity increase by additional measures

- Shifting of planned works and the reduction of track possessions
- Reduction of passenger transport services to increase capacity for rail freight
- Additional staff in the network control centre, the operations control centre in Karlsruhe and signal tower in Singen
- Allocation of additional sidings in Singen and Kehl

### Support of RUs operations

- Free of charge provision of 7 diesel hauling-locomotives for non electrified line Tübingen-Horb
- Support of the RUs for setting up a pool of train drivers
- Additional shunting staff in the train station of Singen for support of operation
- After re-opening of the Gäubahn: provision of a shunting- and pushing locomotive (incl. shunting staff) in Singen

### Nonetheless capacity on diversion routes could not be used fully due to several restricting factors for the RUs



#### Infrastructure

- Line parameters on diversion routes differ from the ones on the Rhine valley railway, e.g. in regard to
  - clearance gauge and
  - length of stable and passing sidings

#### Resources of RUs


- Operating on diversion routes requires additional resources due longer turnaround cycles:
  - lack of train drivers
  - lack of locomotives

#### Interoperability

- Train drivers could not be assigned on certain routes due to
  - missing route knowledge and
  - required operational language
- Available locomotives where not always certified in certain countries on the diversion routes

The lesson is that in general the use of diversion routes in case of incidents must be improved by harmonizing line parameters and increased cross-border interoperability

# On 02.10.2017 traffic on the Rhine valley railway restarted smoothly and volumes are on a normal level



Annual Timetable (Bank holiday on 3 Oct)

Operated trains (incl. ad-hoc traffic)







1. Rastatt incident

#### 2. Rerouting of rail freight

#### 3. Review

# Since the reopening of the line an intensive review process is ongoing



#### **Ongoing process**

Gathering feedback from relevant stakeholders

Establishment of an action list Starting projects at IMs/RFCs and other stakeholders

Presentation of first findings and further process

- Time: until November 2017
- Review surveys, workshops/ discussions with internal and external stakeholders
- Time: until December 2017
- Drawing conclusions from the feedback and developing an action list
- Time: until February 2018
- For most topics still to be defined, few projects already starting after feedback discussions
- Time: until March 2018
- Ongoing process, many requests for presentations and discussions with all stakeholders

### First lessons learned have already been identified



"You never want a serious crisis to go to waste. And what I mean by that is an opportunity to do things that you think you could not do before."-Rahm Emanuel

#### 1. Improving multi-national crisis management / contingency plan

- Agree on international crisis management process supported by RFCs
- Agree on process/check-list for communication supported by RFCs
- Develop multi-national re-routing overview for RFCs
- Define clear capacity allocation rules in case of incidents

#### 2. Developing frame conditions for a flexible production in rail freight


Harmonizing of operational rules and authorisation conditions (in case of incidents)
Implementation of a second operating language

#### 3. Improve infrastructure and international coordination of works

Increase capacity on diversionary lines by improving the infrastructure
Intensify coordination of works along rail freight corridors in cooperation with customers

DB Netz and RFC Rhine-Alpine will develop/propose measures in close cooperation with the relevant stakeholders (IMs, RUs, RFCs, etc.).

# Contingency plans for multi-national incidents should include several elements – first ideas



NETZE

### We experience a high interest in the lessons learned from all kinds of stakeholders



DB Netz and RFC Rhine-Alpine already started a **review process** to gather feedback from all stakeholders. This feedback will be incorporated in the lessons learned and a consecutive action plan.

The timeline is not yet finalized but will include the following dates pre-set by the stakeholders:

11-12 October	Busto Arsizio	Executive Board und Railway Undertakings/Terminal Advisory Group (RAG/TAG) of RFC Rhine-Alpine
16 October	Brussels	Forum of TEN CNC Rhine-Alpine
25 October	Verona	Railway Undertakings/Terminal Advisory Group (RAG/TAG) of RFC Scandinavian-Mediterranean
26 October 2017		RU Dialogue
9-10 November	Brussels	SERAC and NExBo
16 November/ 17	' January 2018	PRIME
29 November	Rome	Management Board of RFC Rhine-Alpine
06 December	Düsseldorf	HUPAC conference "Rastatt disaster: Never again"
07 December	Vienna	Annual Rail Freight Day of EU and RNE
■ 11-12 December	Frankfurt	Executive Board of RFC Rhine-Alpine
23 January 2018	Frankfurt	SBB Infrastruktur / DB Netz AG Management Board
21 February 2018		SBB / DB CEO Meeting
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### Thank you for your attention